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Abstract 
 
Financial instability has increased for many economies in the face of greater capital mobility. 
Eliminating capital flows, especially portfolio investment flows, may reduce volatility, but it 
could also result in domestic capital constraints. To overcome this dilemma, policymakers may 
consider alternatives, such as progressive income taxation, that could raise domestic funds. In 
this paper, we combine several macro economic data sources to test the link between progressive 
taxation and economic stability, economic growth, inequality and fiscal policy. Based on data 
from 1981 to 2002, we find that progressive taxation provides policymakers with the ability to 
conduct countercyclical fiscal policies, which in turn contributes significantly to economic 
stability. In turn, we find no evidence that progressive taxation adversely affects economic 
stability by reducing growth. We find, though, that the possibility to raise the progressiveness is 
constrained by capital mobility and by the level of government spending. Finally, policymakers, 
who may consider consumption taxes, such as the value added taxes (VAT), when tax 
enforcement is ineffective, would see no additional gains in terms of economic stability from the 
implementation of a VAT in combination with progressive income taxation.  
 
Keywords: Progressive personal income taxation; value added taxes; long-term growth; 
economic stability; income inequality; government revenue; fiscal balances.  
I. Introduction 
 
Policymakers in industrializing economies face a dilemma. Many countries have opened 
their borders to international capital inflows to reduce domestic financial constraints, but capital 
account liberalization often sparks a wave of speculative financing, resulting in economic 
volatility with serious ramifications especially for a country’s poor.  
 
One option to resolve this dilemma may be to generate more domestic saving, 
specifically through more progressive personal income taxation. In countries with fairly unequal 
income distributions, more progressive taxation could translate into the generation of more 
stable, long-term financial resources and a greater ability of policymakers to engage in 
countercyclical fiscal policies. Both could help stabilize financial development and make 
economic growth more durable and boost domestic fixed capital formation. Progressive taxation 
can also indirectly affect stability by impacting trends that are associated with less volatility, 
such as more equal income distribution.  
 
On the other hand, some researchers have argued that progressive taxation could stymie 
economic growth as it could reduce the incentives for investment and human capital formation. 
Also, greater revenue generation could crowd out domestic capital available for productive 
investment, thereby hampering growth. 
 
Importantly, the implementation of progressive personal income taxation may be 
constrained by outside factors, chief among them the level of government spending. Moreover, 
tax policy is set in the context of increased global financial integration. Capital may flow to 
countries that offer the best risk-return profile, which countries may want to influence by 
lowering corporate taxes. Thus, corporate tax competition and capital account liberalization may 
constrain policymakers’ ability to design their tax systems. An additional constraint may be 
effective tax collection. Industrializing countries hence may consider implementing a 
consumption tax, such as the value added tax (VAT) to improve tax compliance.  
 
Our research is a first attempt to evaluate progressive personal income taxation as a tool 
to stabilize output in industrializing economies. We thus build on the existing literature in several 
ways. First, we provide a comprehensive, empirical look at the link between progressive personal 
income taxation and a range of economic outcomes, to see if such tax design can contribute to 
economic stability in open industrializing economies. Second, we study the potential constraints 
on establishing progressive personal income taxation in industrializing economies. Third, we 
consider VATs as an alternative revenue source and its connection to economic stability. 
 
II. Progressive Income Taxation and Economic Stability 
 
Policymakers in industrializing economies typically focus on capital account 
liberalization to raise capital, often in the form of short-term portfolio capital inflows. Greater 
portfolio capital inflows can reduce capital constraints and foster financial market developments 
(Durham 2003; Levine 1997; Litan et al. 2001).  
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This may, however, come at the price of greater volatility (Arestis and Demetriades 1999; 
Grabel 1998; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1999; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Weller 
2001). Greater capital inflows may heighten expectations and thus help to create an, ultimately 
unsustainable, asset price boom (Eichengreen, Rosen, and Wyplosz, 1998; Grabel 1998; 
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Weller, 2001). Also, weak domestic institutions can contribute to 
greater instability in the face of increased capital mobility. To some degree, high-quality 
institutions, such as effective supervision or macro economic stability, can mitigate the rising 
chance of financial crises, but they cannot eliminate them (Alba et al. 1999; Arestis and 
Demetriades 1999; Demetriades and Fattouh 1999).  
 
Policymakers could focus on increasing national saving, e.g. through more progressive 
taxation, to replace external capital flows. Other taxes, such as tariffs and corporate taxes, have 
typically played as large or even larger roles than personal income taxes in industrializing 
economies. But, increased trade liberalization has left many countries looking for new sources of 
revenue. For instance, the share of taxes from trade declined in Latin America from 26.8% 
between 1975 and 1980 to 13.3% between 1996 and 2002 (Bird and Zolt, 2005).  
 
Progressive income taxation may be especially appealing in industrializing economies 
that often have highly unequal income distribution, which seems to have increased in many 
countries. There was an unambiguous rise in inequality in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Lustig and Deutsch, 1998; IADB, 1999; UNCTAD, 1997; ECLAC, 1997). And other areas also 
saw inequality rise in the 1980s and 1990s (Faux and Mishel, 2000; Ravallion and Chen, 1997). 
Deininger and Squire (1996) found rising inequality in East Asia, Eastern Europe, and Central 
Asia since 1981, and growing polarization in South Asia. While in China the poverty rate has 
fallen, there has been a rapid rise in inequality from 1985 to 1995 (WB, 2001b).   
 
The potential for additional revenue can be large. While personal income taxes 
constituted 25.0% of all taxes in industrialized economies, they amounted only to 9.1% in 
industrializing economies from 1990 to 2001 (Bird and Zolt, 2005). Many tax systems in 
industrializing countries are substantially less progressive than those in industrialized countries 
(Schmitt, 2003), implying that greater progressiveness could result in more revenue since a 
greater share of revenue would be borne by higher-income earners. Picketty and Qian (2006), for 
example, estimate that rising inequality in China could result in revenue generation from the 
income tax equal to 4.0% in 2010, as compared to 1.0% in 2000, and 0.1% in 1990.  
 
In the same vein, more progressive taxation could improve the automatic stabilizer 
function of a country’s fiscal system. As output declines and income with it, after-tax income 
declines are disproportionately smaller than before-tax income drops, due to the progressiveness 
of the personal income tax. Auerbach and Feenberg (2000), for instance, argue that progressive 
taxation can serve as an automatic stabilizer and that this effect could be as large as traditional 
demand mechanisms. Also, Swanepol and Schoeman (2002) find that South Africa’s taxation 
system has played a role as automatic stabilizer as tax revenue and the output gap are highly 
correlated. Hence, more progressive taxes could directly help stabilize output fluctuations.  
 
More tax progressiveness could impact volatility over time by reducing income 
inequality. Progressive income taxation tends to affect income inequality by equalizing the after-
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tax income distribution. Hassan and Bogetic (1999), for instance, find that progressive Bulgarian 
income taxes helped to reduce inequality. This finding is not universal, as Engel et al. (1998), for 
example, conclude that the Chile’s tax system had little effect on after-tax inequality.  
 
If more progressive taxation, however, is associated with a more equal income 
distribution, it could contribute to less output volatility. Specifically, a more equitable income 
distribution could help to stabilize domestic demand and thus reduce financial and economic 
volatility. The same indirect link seems to exist between civil liberties and political freedom, 
whereby more civil liberties and political freedoms translate into a more equitable income 
distribution and thus more stable demand and output growth (Weller and Singleton, 2004).  
 
A second more long-term link between progressive taxation and stability may exist 
through the connection to economic growth, although the direction of the link is a priori unclear. 
Progressive taxation, for instance, could in theory adversely affect skill development, although 
this argument has little empirical support. Specifically, progressive taxation may discourage 
unskilled workers from developing their skills (Caucutt et al., 2006; Bovenberg and van Ewijk, 
1997). The empirical evidence, though, does not lend support to this theoretical link. Li and 
Sartre (2001, 2004) show that once the model allows heterogeneity across households, tax 
progressiveness does not adversely impact growth. And in a survey of the existing literature, 
Roed and Storm (2002) argue that progressive taxes do not necessarily have to lead to slower 
growth, depending on the labor elasticity of low wage workers, on wage bargaining strength, and 
on individuals’ preferences. And, a more progressive tax system allows for more labor income 
risk sharing among workers. Consequently, there may be efficiency gains from introducing 
progressive income taxation if wage income is not insurable (Nishiyama and Smetters, 2005). 
The result could produce enhanced skill formation and faster long-run economic growth.  
 
Progressive income taxation could impact physical capital formation. A more progressive 
tax system may reduce the amount of private saving available to finance domestic investment. 
This could translate into higher cost of capital and thus impede physical capital formation. On 
the other hand, international capital flows may compensate for the loss of domestic saving and 
the scale of the effect of capital costs on investment has traditionally been much smaller than 
other determinants, such as sales growth. Importantly then, if progressive taxation helps to 
stabilize, if not accelerate, domestic sales growth, this indirect positive effect of progressive 
taxation on investment will likely offset the negative impact of higher cost of capital.1 This may 
be further supported by the argument that a more progressive tax system could increase 
consumption. Barsky et al. (1986), for example, argue that income tax cuts can lead to positive 
effects on consumption, boosting economic growth. In the end, progressive income taxation may 
have either no effect or even a positive impact on physical capital formation.  
 
Furthermore, progressive taxation can improve the prospects for growth if it reduces 
economic volatility. For instance, Ramey and Ramey (1995) find a strong negative link between 
volatility and growth, such that countries with higher volatility experience slower growth. 
 
Policymakers may be constrained in designing tax policy. One obvious constraint is that 
countries need to finance a given level of expenditures, at least in the short run (Mello, 2007).  
                                                 
1 See Leibfritz, Thornton, and Bibbee (1997) for a detailed survey of the theoretical and empirical literature.  
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An additional constraint may be corporate tax competition. Open economies may cut 
corporate taxes to attract mobile capital (Oates 1972, Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986, Wilson 
1986; DeMello, 2007). The evidence, though, on tax competition is limited since governments 
may use other means to attract mobile capital (Benassy-Quere, Gobalraja, and Trannoy, 2007; 
Davies and Ellis, 2007) and since the implementation of tax competition is influenced by 
multiple factors including demand elasticity of taxed goods, cost inelasticity caused by smuggled 
goods across municipal borders, and co-occupation of federal and state taxes (Devereux, 
Lockwood, and Redoano 2006; DeMello 2007). If countries, however, systematically engage in 
tax competition, governments will have to compensate for the reduced revenue by generating 
additional revenues from less mobile labor (Leibfritz, Thornton, and Bibbee, 1997). This could 
result in more progressive income taxation to begin with, which could limit the ability of 
policymakers to further increase the progressiveness of personal income taxation. 
 
A second constraint may be the effectiveness of the tax collection system (Bird and Zolt, 
2005). Because tax collection is often ineffective and greater enforcement introduces a regressive 
bias (Galmarini, 1997; Scotchmer, 1992), many industrializing economies consider the 
implementation of a VAT as an alternative revenue source. To compensate for the regressiveness 
of a VAT, its implementation is often accompanies by progressive elements, such as an 
exclusion of basic consumption items or the addition of a luxury item surcharge (Balassa, 1989). 
 
The evidence on the regressiveness of the VAT is mixed. Thierfelder et al. (2005) found 
the VAT in South Africa to be mildly regressive. Also, Engel et al. (1998) argue that substituting 
the progressive income tax system in Chile with a VAT would impact the after-tax income 
distribution only slightly. And, some researchers have even argued that a VAT can be 
progressive. For instance, Jenkins et al. (2006) argue that the application of the VAT in the 
Dominican Republic led to progressive effective taxation because many of the consumption 
items that lower-income families spend large shares of their income on are not taxed. Also, 
Decoster (2005) finds the VAT in Russia to be progressive. And, Munoz and Sang-Wook Cho 
(2003) argue that the incidence of the VAT in Ethiopia was progressive. A VAT may hence be a 
suitable replacement for ineffectively applied progressive income taxes. 
 
III. Univariate analysis 
 
We proceed in four steps in the univariate analysis. We first consider the evidence of a 
direct link between progressive taxes and economic stability, substitution of capital inflows, and 
countercyclical fiscal policy. Next, we analyze the possible indirect links between progressive 
taxation and income inequality, economic growth, and investment. Furthermore, we consider the 
link between external constraints – corporate tax rates, capital account openness, government 
spending, and VAT levels – and the progressiveness of personal income taxes. And finally, we 
consider if progressive personal income taxation performs better with respect to economic 
stability than a VAT does. 
 
Macroeconomic data are taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. These 
include data on GDP, taxes, fiscal balances, investment, and portfolio flows. In particular, we 
define three fiscal measures, including taxes to GDP, fiscal balances to GDP, and an indicator for 
 4
countercyclical fiscal policy. This indicator takes on the value of “1” if the fiscal balance to GDP 
decreases when growth is at least one standard deviation below the average growth rate for each 
country or if the budget balance improves when growth is above this threshold. Otherwise, this 
indicator takes on the value of “0”. Also, we use the 5-year average real GDP growth rate as 
growth measure and the 5-year standard deviation of growth and the 5-year standard deviation of 
growth relative to the average growth rate during the same five years as volatility measures.  
 
Income inequality data are from the UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database. 
Progressive taxation should result in more income equality, which is measured here by the 
income share of the bottom 20%. Where observations are missing, the share of income for the 
bottom 20% are calculated based on the methodology used by Dollar and Kraay (2001a).  
 
Further, data on capital account openness are from the IMF’s Exchange Rate 
Arrangements and Restrictions Yearbook. We define countries as open if the number of capital 
flow types that have restrictions is smaller than the number without restrictions after 1994.  
 
The tax data are collected from a number of sources.2 We use the top marginal tax rate, 
the average tax rate and the median tax rate to measure the progressiveness of personal income 
taxes – all from the American Enterprise Institute’s International Tax Database.3 We also 
consider the top marginal tax rate from the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Database. In 
each case, higher values should approximate a more progressive personal income tax system.4  
 
The data show a decline in tax progressiveness from 1981 to 2002 (Table 1). The top 
marginal tax rate in 1981 averaged to 52.7% according to the data from the Fraser Institute 
(2005) and to 58.4% according to data from AEI (2006). By 2002, the average top marginal tax 
rate had fallen to 31.3% and 33.8%, respectively. Over the same time period, the average tax rate 
declined from 32.8% to 24.3% and the median tax rate fell slightly less from 31.7% to 24.4%.  
 
The declines in the average and median tax rates are proportionately much smaller than 
the declines in the top marginal tax rates. While the top tax rates declined by 40.6% in the Fraser 
Institute data and by 40.4% in the AEI data, the average tax rate declined by 26.1% (Table 1). 
Also, the median tax rate declined by 22.8%, less than the average tax rate. This suggests that 
taxation became less progressive over time.  
 
This decline in tax progressiveness occurred even though corporate tax rates dropped, 
too. Average corporate tax rates fell by 28.9% and median rates by 22.8% (Table 1). These 
decreases, though, were larger than those for personal income tax rates.  
 
Offsetting these declines were increases in the VAT. On average, VAT rates increased by 
close to 200%, from 1.9% in 1981 to 5.6% in 2002 (Table 1).  
 
                                                 
2 We use all available observations in each case. The results, though, would remain the same if we used only 
complete observations. Details are available from the authors.  
3 We are grateful to Kevin Hassett for sharing the data set with us. A full description of the data set and the initial 
analysis of the data can be found in Hassett and Mathur (2006).  
4 The data do not allow us to control for effective tax rates.  
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Table 1 
Summary Tax Data for Industrializing Economies, 1981 to 2002 
 
  
Top 
marginal 
personal 
income tax 
rate (Fraser 
Institute) 
 
 
Top 
marginal 
personal 
income tax 
rate (AEI) 
 
Average 
personal 
income tax 
rate 
 
Median 
personal 
income tax 
rate 
 
Value added 
tax 
 
Average 
corporate 
tax rate 
 
Median 
corporate 
tax rate 
1981 52.7 56.5 32.8 31.7 13.8 39.4 39.4 
1982 52.3 55.8 32.7 31.9 14.1 39.7 39.6 
1983 52.0 54.9 32.9 32.4 14.0 39.3 39.4 
1984 51.6 54.4 32.3 31.7 13.3 38.9 39.0 
1985 50.9 52.4 31.1 30.5 13.4 38.4 38.5 
1986 49.2 50.2 30.0 29.5 13.5 37.5 37.5 
1987 47.5 48.7 29.6 29.1 13.6 36.9 37.0 
1988 45.8 46.4 28.1 27.7 13.5 36.0 36.1 
1989 44.1 45.5 30.0 29.5 13.6 36.7 36.7 
1990 42.9 44.7 28.9 28.4 13.5 36.4 36.4 
1991 41.3 41.8 27.0 26.7 13.5 35.1 35.1 
1992 39.5 39.5 25.9 25.7 13.7 34.1 34.0 
1993 37.7 38.4 25.1 24.9 14.1 32.9 33.0 
1994 35.9 37.3 25.1 25.2 13.2 32.0 32.0 
1995 35.0 37.4 25.0 24.9 14.1 31.4 31.4 
1996 34.4 36.2 24.5 24.5 13.8 30.9 30.9 
1997 33.9 35.0 23.9 23.9 14.3 30.5 30.5 
1998 33.4 34.7 24.1 24.0 14.1 30.5 30.4 
1999 32.9 34.9 24.0 23.8 14.1 30.1 30.0 
2000 32.5 34.8 23.7 23.5 14.2 29.7 29.6 
2001 31.5 34.0 23.7 23.6 14.5 29.0 28.9 
2002 31.3 33.7 24.3 24.4 14.7 28.2 28.0 
        
1981 to 
2002 
(percent 
change) 
 
-40.6 -40.4 -26.1 -22.8 6.5 -28.4 -28.9 
 
Notes: All figures are unweighted averages. Missing data are interpolated. Only data for industrializing economies 
are included. Calculations are based on unbalanced panel. Changes are calculated based on averages across all 
available countries in a given year. Calculations based on Fraser Institute (2005) and AEI (2006).  
 
III.1 Tax Progressiveness and Economic Stability  
 
We divide the data into two groups. The relevant variables are summarized for countries 
that have tax rates above the median and for those that have tax rates below the median for all 
industrializing economies. We then compare the value of our variables of interest in countries 
with more progressive personal income taxes to those of less progressive tax systems.  
 
There is no robust link between tax progressiveness and economic stability. The standard 
deviation of growth is higher with less progressive taxation in two out of four cases (Table 2). 
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The link between volatility and tax progressiveness depends on the measure of stability and on 
the variable to capture tax progressiveness. Also, there is no difference in the level of capital 
inflows at varying levels of progressiveness. When we consider only instances, when portfolio 
investment flows are present, which are the cases, to which the primary theoretical arguments 
about liberalization and volatility pertain, the results do not change materially (Table 3).  
 
Progressive income taxation seems to permit countries to engage in countercyclical fiscal 
policy. Revenues are larger with more progressive income taxation, which means that countries 
can engage in more expansionary fiscal policy, when needed. Progressiveness is associated with 
a higher chance of engaging in countercyclical fiscal policy. In three out of four cases, the 
probability of engaging in countercyclical fiscal policy is approximately ten percent higher in 
countries with more progressive taxation than in countries with less progressive one. These 
countries may also have a desire to expand social expenditures due to more egalitarian 
preferences as witnessed by the fact that progressive taxation is linked to systematically less 
income inequality. More countercyclical policies and more egalitarian preferences may help 
explain why deficits are also greater with progressive taxation (Tables 2 and 3).  
 
The conclusions on growth and investment tend to depend on the measure for tax 
progressiveness. Growth is faster in countries with more progressive taxation in only one out of 
four cases, although the average difference is close to zero and statistically insignificant (Table 
2). When we consider only cases, when portfolio inflows are present, we find two out of four 
cases, when growth is faster with more tax progressiveness (Table 3). Investment is higher in 
two out of four cases, although the difference is statistically insignificant in half of the cases 
(Tables 2 and 3). Progressive taxation is not systematically linked to growth and investment.  
Table 2 
Economic Outcomes under Different Personal Income Tax Regimes 
 
 Exp. sign 
of 
difference 
Pct. 
correct 
Avg. 
diff. 
Top marginal tax rate 
(Fraser) 
Top marginal tax rate 
(AEI) 
Avg. tax rate Med. Tax rate 
    Below 
median 
Above 
median 
Below 
median 
Above 
median 
Below 
median 
Above 
median 
Below 
median 
Above 
median 
Government 
finances 
           
Taxes/GDP “+” 100 
(75) 
3 21.9 22.2 
(0.493) 
20.6 23.8*** 
(3.778) 
20.9 24.3*** 
(4.656) 
20.4 24.9*** 
(6.069) 
Govt. balance/GDP “+” 0 
(0) 
-2 -2.1 -4.0*** 
(-6.382) 
-1.8 -3.4*** 
(-5.308) 
-1.9 -3.6*** 
(2.820) 
-1.7 -3.6*** 
(-4.696) 
Prob. of 
countercyclicality 
“+” 75 
(0) 
2 31.8 31.2 
(0.281) 
29.2 32.3 
(-0.827) 
29.5 31.6 
(-0.809) 
29.0 31.6 
(-0.912) 
Stability            
Growth volatility “-“ 50 
(25) 
1 6.1 5.2 
(-0.658) 
7.1 4.1* 
(-1.637) 
3.4 6.2*** 
(2.820) 
3.4 7.6** 
(2.203) 
Rel. growth 
volatility 
“-“ 25 
(0) 
47 129.1 60.4 
(0.965) 
47.4 114.7 
(1.318) 
59.7 139.1 
(1.433) 
38.1 148.6* 
(1.850) 
PI flows/GDP “-“ 25 
(25) 
0 0.9 0.4** 
(-2.480) 
0.7 0.7 
(-0.464) 
0.7 0.7 
(0.149) 
0.7 0.8 
(0.389) 
Inequality            
Share of bottom 20 “+” 100 
(100) 
1 4.8 5.1*** 
(2.573) 
4.8 5.5*** 
(2.971) 
4.7 5.7*** 
(6.213) 
4.5 5.7*** 
(7.576) 
Growth            
5-year average 
growth 
“+” 0 
(0) 
-1 5.0 4.2 
(-0.300) 
4.6 3.7*** 
(-2.961) 
4.4 3.6*** 
(-3.068) 
4.3 3.7 
(-1.987) 
Investment/ 
GDP 
“+” 50 
(25) 
0 22.0 21.4 
(-0.922) 
21.5 22.4** 
(2.114) 
22.4 21.8 
(-1.435) 
21.8 22.0 
(0.319) 
 
Notes: Differences are the average for more progressive tax systems minus the respective average of less progressive tax systems. All figures are in percent. See 
the text for variable definitions, data sources, and explanation of expected sign. For the percent of correct expectations, instances of no differences are counted as 
incorrect expectations. PI flows stands for portfolio investment. Figures in parentheses for comparisons are t-statistics and for “pct. Correct” refer to the percent 
of differences that have the correct expected sign and are statistically significant. * indicates significance at the 10%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-
level and *** indicates significance at the 1%-level.  
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Table 3 
Economic Outcomes under Different Personal Income Tax Regimes When Portfolio Investment Flows are Present 
 
 Exp. Sign 
of 
difference 
Pct. 
correct 
Avg. 
diff. 
Top marginal tax rate 
(Fraser) 
Top marginal tax rate 
(AEI) 
Avg. tax rate Med. Tax rate 
    Below 
median 
Above 
median 
Below 
median 
Above 
median 
Below 
median 
Above 
median 
Below 
median 
Above 
median 
Government 
finances 
           
Taxes/GDP “+” 100 
(75) 
3 22.7 23.8 
(1.364) 
21.0 24.7*** 
(3.289) 
21.4 25.2*** 
(4.630) 
21.3 25.6*** 
(5.009) 
Govt. balance/GDP “+” 0 
(0) 
-2 -1.7 -4.0*** 
(-5.548) 
-1.3 -3.6*** 
(-6.025) 
-1.7 -3.9*** 
(-5.092) 
-1.5 -3.9*** 
(-4.896) 
Prob. of 
countercyclicality 
“+” 75 
(0) 
1 41.8 39.2 
(0.728) 
38.9 40.5 
(-0.676) 
38.5 42.5 
(-1.011) 
38.8 41.3 
(-0.628) 
Stability            
Growth volatility “-“ 50 
(25) 
1 7.1 4.3 
(-1.243) 
8.1 3.5* 
(-1.657) 
3.3 7.3** 
(-2.533) 
3.4 9.6** 
(2.184) 
Rel. growth 
volatility 
“-“ 25 
(0) 
43 126.4 17.1 
(-1.013) 
36.8 115.4* 
(1.653) 
28.6 123.1** 
(2.034) 
24.3 133.9** 
(2.157) 
PI flows/GDP “-“ 25 
(25) 
0 0.9 0.4** 
(-2.480) 
0.7 0.7 
(-0.465) 
0.7 0.7 
(0.149) 
0.7 0.8 
(0.389) 
Inequality            
Share of bottom 20 “+” 75 
(75) 
1 5.0 5.0 
(-0.186) 
4.8 5.4** 
(2.160) 
4.6 5.8*** 
(6.101) 
4.2 5.9*** 
(8.486) 
Growth            
5-year average 
growth 
“+” 50 
(0) 
0 4.3 4.6 
(1.101) 
4.6 4.3 
(-0.935) 
4.4 4.1 
(-1.029) 
4.2 4.3 
(0.160) 
Investment/ GDP “+” 50 
(25) 
0 22.0 22.7 
(1.208) 
22.2 23.4* 
(1.676) 
23.4 21.9** 
(-2.496) 
22.6 22.0 
(0.889) 
 
Notes: Differences are the average for more progressive tax systems minus the respective average of less progressive tax systems. All figures are in percent. See 
the text for variable definitions, data sources, and explanation of expected sign. For the percent of correct expectations, instances of no differences are counted as 
incorrect expectations. PI flows stands for portfolio investment. Figures in parentheses for comparisons are t-statistics and for “pct. Correct” refer to the percent 
of differences that have the correct expected sign and are statistically significant. * indicates significance at the 10%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-
level and *** indicates significance at the 1%-level.  
III.2 Constraints on Progressive Taxation 
 
The implementation of more progressive income taxation may be subject to three 
possible external constraints, the level of government expenditures, corporate tax rates, and 
capital account liberalization.  
 
External constraints are not always associated with more progressive taxes. Increased 
government spending is associated with a more progressive tax system (Table 4). In comparison, 
though, countries with open capital accounts and lower corporate taxes tend to have less 
progressive personal tax systems than countries that are unconstrained.  
 
Industrializing economies may face stricter constraints than theory suggests. For instance, 
capital account openness and lower corporate taxes may reflect constraints on all income taxes. 
With a fixed level of government expenditures, this should result in larger budget deficits. As a 
result, governments may look for additional revenue sources, particularly consumption taxes.  
 
We test this argument. Specifically, we consider total revenue relative to GDP, fiscal 
balances, and the level of the VAT in constrained and unconstrained instances to see if 
constraints are associated with less spending elsewhere, wider budget deficits, and higher VATs 
and payroll taxes. Increased government spending is associated with a larger VAT and higher 
payroll taxes, but also greater budget deficits, despite higher revenues. Furthermore, under 
capital mobility we find a lower VAT, but smaller budget deficits, higher revenue generation, 
and higher government consumption expenditures, which seem to be financed, among other 
things, out of higher payroll taxes. Finally, lower corporate taxes are associated with smaller 
deficits despite lower VATs and fewer revenues, which may be compensated for by higher 
payroll taxes and decreased government spending (Table 5).  
 
Our figures suggest a few important results. First, external liberalization seems to impose 
an additional constraint on tax design, as policymakers may have to reduce budget deficits in 
order to attract foreign capital (Blecker, 1999). Second, in the same vein, the reduction of budget 
deficits under capital account liberalization are associated with greater revenue and not 
necessarily decreased spending, although spending may become more pro-cyclical (Blecker, 
1999). Third, policymakers seem to shift from progressive income taxation to more regressive 
payroll taxes to compensate for the loss of corporate incomes taxes, suggesting that constraints 
on corporate income taxes may also hold to some degree for personal income taxes. The 
overarching lesson is that policymakers tend to find ways to increase revenue, but do not seem to 
do so by raising the progressiveness of income taxation, especially in open economies.  
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Table 4 
Progressiveness of Personal Income Taxation with and without External Constraints 
 
 Exp. Sign 
of 
difference 
Pct. 
Correct 
Avg. 
difference 
Top marginal tax rate 
(Fraser) 
Top marginal tax rate 
(AEI) 
Avg. tax rate Med. Tax rate 
    With 
constraint 
 
Without 
constraint 
With 
constraint 
Without 
constraint 
With 
constraint 
Without 
constraint 
With 
constraint 
Without 
constraint 
Government 
spending/GDP 
“-“ 75 
(75) 
-2 42.3 42.5 
(-0.209) 
43.3 41.1*** 
(3.208) 
29.0 25.5*** 
(5.097) 
29.0 24.9*** 
(5.639) 
Capital 
account 
open/close 
“-“ 0 
(0) 
12 26.4 48.0*** 
(24.229) 
 
33.0 44.7*** 
(13.181) 
21.8 28.8*** 
(11.206) 
21.6 28.5*** 
(10.716) 
 
Avg. 
corporate tax 
rate 
“-“ 0 
(0) 
13 35.6 51.1*** 
(16.388) 
35.7 50.3*** 
(18.879) 
22.7 32.8*** 
(18.752) 
22.4 32.5*** 
(17.994) 
Median corp. 
tax rate 
 
“-“ 0 
(0) 
13 35.5 51.1*** 
(16.368) 
35.6 50.3*** 
(18.859) 
22.7 32.7*** 
(18.869) 
22.4 32.6*** 
(18.141) 
 
Notes: Differences are the average tax rate without constraint minus the tax rate with constraints. Constraints are high government spending, open capital 
accounts, and low corporate taxes. All figures are in percent. See the text for variable definitions, data sources, and explanation of expected sign. For the percent 
of correct expectations, instances of no differences are counted as incorrect expectations. PI flows stands for portfolio investment. Figures in parentheses for 
comparisons are t-statistics and for “pct. Correct” refer to the percent of differences that have the correct expected sign and are statistically significant. * indicates 
significance at the 10%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level and *** indicates significance at the 1%-level.  
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Table 5 
Government Revenue, Fiscal Balances and Value Added Taxes with and without External Constraints 
 
 Taxes/GDP Fiscal balance/GDP VAT rate Government 
consumption 
spending/GDP 
Payroll taxes 
 With 
const. 
 
Without 
const. 
With 
const. 
Without 
const. 
With 
const. 
Without 
const. 
With 
const. 
Without 
const. 
With 
const. 
Without 
const. 
Government 
spending/ 
GDP 
28.5 13.1*** 
(45.683) 
-4.1 -1.8*** 
(-9.832) 
15.6 11.1*** 
(8.303) 
13.7 5.4*** 
(21.662) 
6.5 3.5*** 
(6.645) 
Capital 
account 
open/close 
22.9 20.9*** 
(-3.447) 
-1.3 -3.6*** 
(-6.984) 
12.7 14.7*** 
(3.894) 
12.0 9.6*** 
(5.085) 
10.5 9.5*** 
(-3.703) 
Avg. 
corporate tax 
rate 
21.9 24.2*** 
(3.394) 
-2.0 -4.0*** 
(-6.029) 
13.8 15.5*** 
(3.078) 
8.9 9.8* 
(1.633) 
 
10.5 9.5 
(-1.333) 
Median corp. 
tax rate 
 
21.9 24.1*** 
(3.248) 
-2.0 -4.1*** 
(-6.174) 
13.8 15.5*** 
(3.106) 
9.0 10.0* 
(1.771) 
10.5 9.6 
(1.255) 
 
Notes: Differences are the average tax rate without constraint minus the tax rate with constraints. Constraints are high government spending, open capital 
accounts, and low corporate taxes. All figures are in percent. See the text for variable definitions, data sources, and explanation of expected sign. For the percent 
of correct expectations, instances of no differences are counted as incorrect expectations. PI flows stands for portfolio investment. Figures in parentheses for 
comparisons are t-statistics and for “pct. Correct” refer to the percent of differences that have the correct expected sign and are statistically significant. * indicates 
significance at the 10%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level and *** indicates significance at the 1%-level.  
 
III.3 Value Added Taxes and Economic Stability 
 
Countries may look towards the implementation of consumption taxes to overcome 
another constraint – ineffective tax collection. The short-term link between a VAT and economic 
stability seems weaker than in the case of personal income taxes (Table 6). Volatility and capital 
inflows are greater when the VAT is higher and the size difference between high-tax and low-tax 
regimes is greater than is the case for different personal income tax regimes. In contrast, the 
difference in relative volatility is smaller in the VAT case than in the personal income tax case. 
Also, revenues are higher with a larger VAT and the size of the difference is greater than in the 
case of progressive taxes. Moreover, budget deficits are again greater with higher taxes, but the 
difference between high-tax and low-tax regimes is about half the difference that it is for the 
comparison of personal income tax regimes. In the same vein, countries with higher VATs are 
less likely than countries with lower VATs to engage in countercyclical fiscal policy, although 
the difference is statistically insignificant. Countries lose some of the short-term stability benefits 
that they may enjoy under progressive income taxation, when they switch to a VAT.  
 
A similar conclusion may be drawn with respect to longer-term links between taxes and 
economic stability. A higher VAT is associated with less income inequality and on average about 
the same growth rate, but less investment. The difference in investment is also greater between 
high VAT and low VAT regimes than it is for personal income taxes (Table 6).  
 
Table 6 
Revenue, Capital Flows, Growth, and Stability under Different VAT Regimes 
 
 
 
Exp. Sign of 
difference 
Below median Above median Difference 
No condition     
Government finances     
Taxes/GDP “+” 19.5 24.7 
(6.330) 
5 
Govt. balance/GDP “+” -2.4 -3.0 
(1.432) 
-1 
Prob. of 
countercylicality 
“+” 33.0 31.0 
(-0.616) 
-2 
Stability     
Growth volatility “-“ 3.1 9.6*** 
(2.594) 
7 
Rel. growth volatility “-“ 138.7 154.9 
(0.137) 
16 
PI flows/GDP “-“ 0.3 0.9*** 
(3.828) 
1 
Inequality     
Share of bottom 20 “+” 4.5 5.5*** 
(5.818) 
1 
Growth     
5-year average growth “+” 4.0 3.8 
(-0.593) 
0 
Investment/GDP “+” 21.3 20.4* 
(-1.922) 
-1 
PI inflows present     
Government finances     
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Taxes/GDP “+” 20.0 24.4 
(4.817) 
4 
Govt. balance/GDP “+” -2.2 -3.0 
(-1.562) 
-1 
Prob. of 
countercyclicality 
“+” 42.3 37.4 
(-1.180) 
-5 
Stability     
Growth volatility “-“ 3.1 10.5** 
(2.362) 
7 
Rel. growth volatility “-“ 156.6 82.7 
(-0.551) 
-74 
PI flows/GDP “-“ 0.3 0.9*** 
(3.828) 
1 
Inequality     
Share of bottom 20 “+” 4.5 5.6*** 
(5.270) 
1 
Growth     
5-year average growth “+” 4.2 4.1 
(-0.024) 
0 
Investment/GDP 
 
“+” 22.3 20.7*** 
(-2.727) 
-2 
 
Notes: All figures are in percent. See the text for variable definitions, data sources, and explanation of expected sign. 
The expected signs refer to the progressive income taxation comparison and are included here only for comparison 
purposes. Figures in parentheses for comparisons are t-statistics and for “pct. Correct” refer to the percent of 
differences that have the correct expected sign and are statistically significant. * indicates significance at the 10%-
level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level and *** indicates significance at the 1%-level.  
 
Would our conclusions change if we combined progressive personal income taxes with a 
VAT? Such a combination may help improve the short-term stability outlook, compared to a 
situation of solely progressive taxes (Table 7). The relative output volatility increases in two out 
of four cases. And, in three out of four cases, the relative output volatility is lower when 
progressive personal income taxes are combined with a high VAT, compared to a combination 
with a low VAT.5 Also, a high VAT in combination with progressive income taxes give 
countries more room to engage in countercyclical fiscal policy. And, the combination of a high 
VAT with progressive income taxation seems to improve the overall short-term stability outlook, 
if relative volatility is the most appropriate indicator of macro economic stability. Finally, the 
combination of progressive income taxes with a high VAT improves the growth prospects and 
reduces inequality in three out of four cases. 
 
The combination of progressive income taxes with a low VAT offers less of an 
improvement. On the plus side, it reduces absolute volatility and short-term capital inflows, but it 
increases relative output volatility and lowers the chance of countercyclical fiscal policy. 
Moreover, inequality and growth worsen or are unchanged, when progressive income taxes are 
combined with a low VAT.  
 
The results thus suggest that the outlook for economic volatility seems to improve when 
progressive personal income taxes are combined with a high VAT, while the same is not true 
when progressive personal income taxes are combined with a low VAT.  
                                                 
5 Authors’ calculations are not shown here, but are available upon request.  
 
Table 7 
Revenue, Capital Flows, Growth, and Stability under Different Personal Income Tax Regimes with VAT 
 
  
Improvmt.
if sign… 
 
Difference to high personal income taxes 
alone 
 
 
Top marginal tax 
rate (Fraser) 
 
Top marginal tax 
rate (AEI) 
 
 
Avg. tax rate 
 
Median tax rate 
  With high VAT With low VAT With 
high 
VAT 
With 
low 
VAT 
With high 
VAT 
With 
low 
VAT 
 
With 
high 
VAT 
With 
low 
VAT 
With 
high 
VAT 
With 
low 
VAT 
  Incidence Avg. 
 
Incidence Avg.         
Government 
finances 
             
Taxes/GDP “+” 100 1 0 -5 0.5 -2.5 1.5 -5.0 1.3 -5.4 1.4 -6.0 
Govt. balance/GDP “+” 25 0 50 0 -0.2 0.8 0.2 -0.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Prob. of 
countercyclicality 
“+” 75 0 25 1 -0.7 3.8 0.9 -0.7 0.6 0.0 0.7 -0.8 
Stability              
Growth volatility “-” 0 1 100 -2 0.4 -1.6 0.2 -0.6 0.8 -3.0 1.2 -4.4 
Rel. growth 
volatility 
“-“ 50 4 25 20 49.8 101.3 106.7 140.9 139.3 140.5 151.4 140.5 
PI flows/GDP “-” 0 0 100 0 0.1 -0.2 0.2 -0.5 0.2 -0.4 0.2 -0.5 
Inequality              
Share of bottom 20 “+” 75 0 0 -1 0.0 -0.1 0.2 -0.6 0.3 -0.7 0.3 -0.8 
Growth              
5-year average 
growth 
“+” 75 0 0 0 0.1 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.3 0.1 -0.4 
Investment/ 
GDP 
 
“+” 75 0 25 1 21.3 22.0 22.8 20.9 21.8 21.1 22.2 21.1 
 
Notes: All figures are in percent. See the text for variable definitions, data sources, and explanation of expected sign. The expected signs refer to the comparison 
with progressive income taxation alone. A positive sign indicates that the measure is greater for the combined taxes than for progressive personal income taxes 
alone. Incidence refers to the number of instances, in which the difference to just progressive taxation improves the stability outlook. 
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IV. Multivariate Analysis 
 
We test the three basic relationships using multivariate analyses. Specifically, we 
consider first the link between economic stability and a number of economic variables, including 
tax progressives. Next, we analyze the determinants of tax progressiveness. And finally, we see 
if the addition of a VAT to progressive income taxation has any bearing on economic stability.  
 
IV.1 Progressive Taxation and Economic Stability 
 
Our first analysis focuses on the connection between progressive taxation and economic 
stability. The dependent variable is economic stability, defined as the growth rate relative to the 
standard deviation of growth for that country over the entire sample period.  
 
The explanatory variables are investment, income inequality, capital inflows, and a 
measure for fiscal policy. The measure for fiscal policy combines growth and changes in fiscal 
balances into a continuous variable, defined as follows:  
 
ncefiscalbala
f
gGrowthlicalityCountercyc σ
σ+=    (1) 
 
where fiscalbalance denotes the growth rate of the fiscal balance relative to GDP, σg is 
the standard deviation of the growth rate and σf is the standard deviation of the growth rate of the 
fiscal balance relative to GDP. If growth and fiscal balances move in the same direction, the 
country engages in countercyclical policies and the variable should show larger values. The 
opposite is true if both growth rates move in opposite directions. The variable is also constructed, 
such that the conditional variances of the two components are the same.  
 
The regression analysis also includes measures for tax progressiveness. These variables 
control for influences of tax policy on variables that are not included in the analysis, but that 
could have a potential impact on economic stability, such as human capital formation.  
 
The hypotheses to be tested are straightforward. Economic stability is expected to be 
positively related to investment, countercyclicality, capital inflows and progressive taxation and 
negatively related to inequality. In this vein, the fate of an economy may depend to some degree 
on the potential volatility of short-term capital flows, which could increase if countercyclical 
policy results in larger budget deficits that are not offset by greater domestic saving.  
 
The analysis employs a dynamic OLS approach (Stock and Watson, 1993). This approach 
controls for the fact that many macro economic series, e.g. tax rates, are non-stationary. The 
model uses the first difference with no lag and the first lagged value of each explanatory 
variable. The estimation is robust, when additional lags and leads for the changes of the 
explanatory variables are included. The coefficients on the differences capture short-term 
deviations from long-term relationship, while the levels measure these long-term links.  
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Importantly, economic stability is systematically connected to countercyclical policy.6 
The first regression in table 8 presents the baseline case without controls for progressive 
taxation. All variables are statistically insignificant or have the expected sign. Economic stability 
in the short-run is positively correlated with investment, capital inflows and countercyclical 
fiscal policy. In the long-run, investment is no longer statistically significant, which highlights 
the short-run importance of investment for business cycle movements. The biggest short-run and 
long-run contribution from progressive taxation to economic stability thus emerges from a 
country’s ability to engage in countercyclical fiscal policy, although greater deficits may expose 
countries to increased volatility from more short-term capital inflows.  
 
When progressive taxation variables are included, they have a small adverse long-run 
impact on economic stability. While this points to potentially relevant trade-offs when 
considering progressive taxation as an economic stabilization tool, it is important to note that the 
estimated coefficient is relatively small. At the average, an increase of one standard deviation of 
the median tax rate, for instance, results in a 8.5% reduction of economic stability, while a one-
standard deviation increase in countercyclical policy increases stability by 17.1% in the long-run 
and by 17.2% in the short-run. That is, the ability of economies to engage in countercyclical 
fiscal policy with more progressive taxation may outweigh potentially adverse effects from more 
progressive taxation in terms of economic stability.  
 
Table 8 
Regression Analysis of Macro Economic Stability 
 
Explanatory variable Baseline 
(1) 
Top marginal tax 
rate (Frazer) 
Top marginal 
tax rate (AEI) 
Avg. tax 
rate 
Median 
tax rate 
0.210*** 0.205*** 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.210*** Investment to GDP 
(differenced) 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.016 
0.033*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.031*** Indicator for 
countercyclicality 
(differenced) 
0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
-0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 Inc. share of bottom 20% 
(differenced) 0.053 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 
0.043*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** Capital inflows to GDP 
(differenced) 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 
 -0.05**    Top marginal tax rate 
(Frazer) (differenced)  0.030    
  -0.00   Top marginal tax rate 
(AEI) (differenced)   0.008   
   -0.01  Average tax rate 
(differenced)    0.010  
    -0.01 Median tax rate 
(differenced)     0.010 
-0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 Investment to GDP 
(lagged) 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 
0.039*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** Indicator for 
countercyclicality (lagged) 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
                                                 
6 The results are robust, when the continuous fiscal policy variable is replaced by the indicator variable for 
countercyclical fiscal policy discussed in the previous section.  
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0.008 0.048 0.047 0.031 0.024 Inc. share of bottom 20% 
(lagged) 0.062 0.065 0.063 0.063 0.063 
0.049*** 0.049** 0.052** 0.051** 0.051** Capital inflows to GDP 
(lagged) 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 
 -0.01**    Top marginal tax rate 
(Frazer) (lagged)  0.006    
  -0.01**   Top marginal tax rate 
(AEI) (lagged)   0.005   
   -0.01**  Average tax rate (lagged) 
   0.008  
    -0.01** Median tax rate (lagged) 
    0.008 
1.162*** 1.628*** 1.614*** 1.671*** 1.643*** Constant 
0.437 0.487 0.474 0.481 0.483 
      
N 287 287 287 287 287 
R-Squared 
 
0.466 0.477 0.479 0.478 0.477 
 
Notes: See text for explanation of variables and sources. All regressions are conducted with country fixed effects. 
Analysis excludes industrialized economies. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. *** denotes significance at 
1%-level, ** denotes significance at 5%-level, and * denotes significance at 10%-level.  
 
IV.2 The Determinants of Progressive Taxation 
 
Next, we test whether the potential constraints on the implementation of progressive 
taxation, as the univariate analysis suggests. Following standard tax determination models, the 
dependent variables are the four progressive tax measures and the explanatory variables include 
government spending, corporate tax rates and capital inflows. The regression is again estimated 
using a dynamic OLS approach with the first difference with no lag and the lagged value of the 
explanatory variables.  
 
The implementation of progressive taxes indeed seems to be constrained by government 
spending (table 9). This systematic connection holds only in the long-run, but not in the short-
run. This suggests that governments looking for additional revenue may be limited in their ability 
to increase the progressiveness of personal income taxation if spending is high, especially since 
spending may not change much over time, thus explaining the persistence of this constraint.  
 
Furthermore, as discussed before, greater openness may create two pressure points on tax 
design. International corporate tax competition may lead policymakers to seek more revenue 
from less mobile labor. In addition, reduced revenue from fewer tariffs and possibly higher 
expenditures to attract capital also lead policymakers to look for more revenue elsewhere. The 
results, though, indicate that increased capital account liberalization may be associated with 
growing pressures to lower taxes, both for individuals and corporations. In particular, increased 
capital inflows are associated with less progressive personal income taxation (Table 9), at least 
with lower top marginal tax rates in the long-run. In addition, lower corporate tax rates go along 
with lower personal income tax rates. The impact again seems to be larger on top marginal tax 
rates than on average and median tax rates. These results indicate that countries may decide, 
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possibly for non-economic reasons, to reduce their overall tax rates, especially at the top end of 
the income scale, when a country becomes more economically integrated.  
 
Table 9 
Regression Analysis of the Determinants of Tax Progressiveness 
 
  
Top marginal tax 
rate (Fraser) 
 
 
Top marginal tax 
rate (AEI) 
 
Avg. tax rate 
 
Median tax rate 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.08 -0.08 0.037 0.037 0.028 0.027 Govt. 
spending 
(differenced). 
(0.113) (0.112) (0.115) (0.114) (0.077) (0.076) (0.080) (0.080) 
0.002  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 GDP growth 
(differenced) (0.014)  (0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
-0.28** 0.002 -0.10 -0.14 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 Capital 
inflows to 
GDP 
(differenced) 
(0.140) (0.014) (0.142) (0.142) (0.095) (0.094) (0.099) (0.099) 
0.330***  0.444***  0.425***  0.406***  Avg. corp. 
tax rate 
(differenced) 
(0.126)  (0.128)  (0.085)  (0.090)  
 0.328***  0.440***  0.422***  0.407*** Median corp. 
tax rate 
(differenced) 
 (0.123)  (0.126)  (0.084)  (0.088) 
0.326*** 0.314*** 0.257** 0.247** 0.182*** 0.174*** 0.148** 0.140** Govt. 
spending to 
GDP (lagged) 
(0.099) (0.098) (0.100) (0.100) (0.067) (0.066 (0.070 (0.070 
0.001 0.000 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 GDP growth 
(lagged) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
0.740***  0.921***  0.556***  0.537***  Avg. corp. 
tax rate 
(lagged) 
(0.069)  (0.070)  (0.047)  (0.049)  
 0.754***  0.925***  0.560***  0.543*** Med. corp. 
tax rate 
(lagged) 
 (0.068)  (0.070)  (0.046)  (0.049) 
-0.53*** -0.60*** -0.45** -0.52** -0.15 -0.19 -0.15 -0.19 Capital 
inflows to 
GDP (lagged) 
(0.203) (0.203) (0.206) (0.207) (0.138) (0.138) (0.145) (0.145) 
8.402*** -0.31** 2.011 2.199 3.101 3.210 4.399** 4.466** Constant 
(2.913) (0.139) (2.956) (2.924) (1.973) (1.951) (2.072) (2.048) 
         
N 371 8.296*** 371 371 371 371 371 371 
R-squared 
 
0.328 2.872 0.402 0.409 0.363 0.319 0.371 0.327 
 
Notes: See text for explanation of variables and sources. All regressions are conducted with country fixed effects. 
Analysis excludes industrialized economies. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. *** denotes significance at 
1%-level, ** denotes significance at 5%-level, and * denotes significance at 10%-level. 
 
IV.3 Combining Progressive Taxation and Consumption Taxes 
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An additional constraint may be tax compliance, which countries may try to improve 
through the implementation of a consumption tax. We test if the combination of a VAT and 
progressive income taxation improves economic stability. To do so, we re-estimate the 
regression model for economic stability as before, but include the VAT as explanatory variable.  
 
The results indicate that countries with a VAT and progressive taxation are actually less 
stable than the countries without a VAT (Table 10). In particular, a higher VAT reduces 
economic stability, at least in the short-run, possibly because it may have adverse effects on 
aggregate demand growth. This may indicate that the effectiveness of countercyclical fiscal 
policy could be reduced in the short-run due to the existence of a VAT. Second, capital inflows 
are again positively correlated with economic stability, both in the short-run and in the long-run. 
The size of the estimated coefficient, though, is larger than before. Given that large swings in 
portfolio flows often underlie economic volatility, this result suggests that countries with a VAT 
and progressive income taxation may be more exposed to the vagaries of international capital 
flows than countries without a VAT and just progressive personal income taxation. 
 
Table 10 
Regression Analysis of Determinants of Economic Stability with VAT 
 
Explanatory variable Baseline 
(1) 
Top marginal tax 
rate (Frazer) 
Top marginal 
tax rate (AEI) 
Avg. tax 
rate 
Median 
tax rate 
0.217*** 0.210*** 0.211*** 0.214*** 0.216*** Investment to GDP 
(differenced) 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022 
0.033** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.032** 0.032** Indicator for 
countercyclicality 
(differenced) 
0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 
-0.02 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 Inc. share of bottom 20% 
(differenced) 0.065 0.067 0.065 0.066 0.066 
0.067* 0.064* 0.068* 0.067* 0.068* Capital inflows to GDP 
(differenced) 0.037 0.037 0.036 0.036 0.037 
VAT (differenced) -0.08** -0.07** -0.09*** -0.08** -0.08** 
 0.034 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.034 
 -0.04    Top marginal tax rate 
(Frazer) (differenced)  0.035    
  -0.02*   Top marginal tax rate 
(AEI) (differenced)   0.011   
   -0.01  Average tax rate 
(differenced)    0.011  
    -0.01 Median tax rate 
(differenced)     0.011 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 Investment to GDP 
(lagged) 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 
0.045*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.044*** Indicator for 
countercyclicality (lagged) 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.017 
-0.00 0.025 0.030 0.007 0.001 Inc. share of bottom 20% 
(lagged) 0.083 0.086 0.083 0.083 0.083 
0.089* 0.087** 0.093* 0.091* 0.091* Capital inflows to GDP 
(lagged) 0.049 0.051 0.049 0.049 0.049 
VAT (lagged) -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
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 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.019 
 -0.01**    Top marginal tax rate 
(Frazer) (lagged)  0.007    
  -0.01**   Top marginal tax rate 
(AEI) (lagged)   0.007   
   -0.01*  Average tax rate (lagged) 
   0.009  
    -0.01* Median tax rate (lagged) 
    0.009 
1.231* 1.512* 2.119*** 1.804** 1.767** Constant 
0.715 0.797 0.795 0.766 0.769 
      
N 217 217 217 217 217 
R-Squared 
 
0.430 0.437 0.450 0.442 0.440 
Notes: See text for explanation of variables and sources. All regressions are conducted with country fixed effects. 
Analysis excludes industrialized economies. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. *** denotes significance at 
1%-level, ** denotes significance at 5%-level, and * denotes significance at 10%-level.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we consider the evidence on the relationship between progressive personal 
income taxation and economic stability. We study the short-term link of progressive taxation on 
economic stability through its effect on portfolio capital flows and the ability of governments to 
conduct countercyclical fiscal policy. In addition, we study the longer-term connection between 
progressive taxation and economic stability through its impact on income inequality and growth, 
whereby improvements in both may ultimately translate into less volatility.  
 
We conclude that greater progressiveness allows countries to engage in countercyclical 
fiscal policy and thus creates the policy space to stabilize economic fluctuations, both in the 
short-run and long-run.  
 
There is, however, a potential tradeoff as more progressive taxation is also associated 
with less stability in the long-run due to factors not directly accounted for in our empirical 
model, such as human capital development. In the end, though, the potential stability enhancing 
benefits from more countercyclical fiscal policy far outweigh such countervailing effects.  
 
The implementation of progressive taxation, though, seems particularly constrained in 
open economies. In particular, greater capital mobility and increased corporate tax competition 
tend to go along with less progressive personal income taxation, especially due to reductions in 
top marginal tax rates. There may be a common non-economic explanation that links greater 
economic integration to lower personal and corporate income tax rates. Investigating such a 
potential non-economic link will have to be investigated in future research.  
 
Another potential constraint on the implementation of progressive personal income 
taxation may the presence of ineffective tax collection, which may lead countries to increasingly 
rely on consumption taxes, such as the value added tax. Our results, though, indicate that the 
combination of a value added tax with progressive personal income taxation may reduce the 
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stability benefits of progressive taxation. In particular, the presence of a VAT is also associated 
with a greater exposure to short-term portfolio capital flows, which are often associated with 
increased economic volatility.  
 
These results may tentatively suggest a few policy conclusions. In particular, 
industrializing economies can raise economic stability through progressive income taxation. This 
is easier to accomplish with less capital account liberalization. Moreover, the benefits may be 
offset when countries introduce consumption taxes at the same time. 
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